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The Impact Factor Fallacy
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The use of the journal impact factor (JIF) as a measure for the quality of individual
manuscripts and the merits of scientists has faced significant criticism in recent years.
We add to the current criticism in arguing that such an application of the JIF in policy
and decision making in academia is based on false beliefs and unwarranted inferences.
To approach the problem, we use principles of deductive and inductive reasoning to
illustrate the fallacies that are inherent to using journal-based metrics for evaluating the
work of scientists. In doing so, we elaborate that if we judge scientific quality based on
the JIF or other journal-based metrics we are either guided by invalid or weak arguments
or in fact consider our uncertainty about the quality of the work and not the quality itself.
Keywords: journal impact factor, journal ranking, scientific excellence, open access, publishing, scholarly
communication, reasoning
INTRODUCTION
The journal impact factor (JIF) was initially used to help librarians make decisions about journals
(Garfield, 2006). However, during the last decades the usage of the JIF has significantly changed.
In deviating from its original purpose it is now widely used to evaluate the quality of individual
publications and the work of scientists (Amin and Mabe, 2003; Arnold and Fowler, 2010). Since
then, the measure itself has been extensively criticized for various reasons. For example, it is
well known that the JIF is an inaccurate estimate for the expected number of citations of an
article within a specific journal (Callaway, 2016; Larivière et al., 2016), that it is relatively easy
to manipulate (McVeigh and Mann, 2009; Tort et al., 2012), it does not show noticeable positive
associations with objective measures of the quality of the science (Yeung, 2017; Brembs, 2018),
and might be affected by the increasing usage of preprint servers1. While some bibliometricians
aim to establish distinctive and perhaps more justified use cases of the JIF in approximating the
visibility of publications instead of using it as a measure of quality (Gumpenberger et al., 2012;
Gorraiz et al., 2016, 2017), the JIF nonetheless has deeply affected the work of scientists and decision
making in academia as a measure for scientific excellence. Scientists get jobs, tenure, grants, and
bonuses based on the impact of the journals they are publishing their manuscripts in, outgrowths
whose consequences were critically discussed in many previous reviews, comments and editorials
(Seglen, 1997; Lehmann et al., 2006; Della Sala and Crawford, 2007; Simons, 2008; Reich, 2013;
Casadevall and Fang, 2014; DePellegrin and Johnston, 2015; Werner, 2015; Stephan et al., 2017
and please see Brembs et al., 2013 for very thorough analyses of the detrimental effects of measures
1A further, and less frequently discussed bias might be introduced through the increasing usage of preprint servers. Here,
articles which have been published as preprints continue to gather citations even if the article, or a revised version of
the articles has been published in a journal. The citations of the preprints are yet not added to the citation count of the
subsequently published version of the article (Davis, 2018). This opens the door for a variety of novel biases for the JIF e.g.,
if authors are more likely to update their citation library in case of preprints being published in journals with higher JIF
compared to preprints published in journals with lower JIF.
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of journal rank). Notably, the JIF has also been explicitly referred
to as a tool to decide how to distribute funds across institutions,
for example in Germany (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
(DFG) [German Science Foundation], 2004), and thereby affects
policy making on a much larger scale.
“For the calculation of the performance-based bonus of the
unit providing the service (department or clinic) the original
publications may be used with the unweighted impact factor of
the publication organ, in the sense of a step-wise introduction
of quality criteria. Thereby, a first- and last authorship may be
considered with one third each and the remaining third can be
distributed across all remaining authors [. . .].”2
Besides such explicit usage of the JIF for evaluating scientific
excellence, the JIF also implicitly affects other measures which
have been suggested to better approximate the quality of a
scientist’s work or of a specific study [e.g., the h-index, Hirsch,
2005 and the Relative Citation Ratio (RCR), Hutchins et al.,
2015]. For example, there is some evidence that the number of
citations of an article is influenced by the JIF of the journal
where the article was published, regardless of the quality of
the article itself (Callaham et al., 2002; Lozano et al., 2012;
Brembs et al., 2013; Cantrill, 2016). This implies that measures
that are based on the citations of the individual articles are
still influenced by the JIF of the publication organ. With the
many different ways of how the JIF can influence decision
making in academia and is used as an explicit tool for policy
making and staffing3, it is not surprising that empirical data now
demonstrate the JIF to be one of the most powerful predictors
for academic success (Van Dijk et al., 2014). Accordingly, we
could recently show that some scientists may have adapted
to these reward principles in their environment by showing a
greater reward signal in the brain’s reward structures in the
prospect of an own high impact publication (Paulus et al.,
2015).
In line with the rising initiatives to prevent the use of the
JIF for evaluating the quality of science (see e.g., the DORA
initiative, Alberts, 2013; Cagan, 2013 or the report of the
Wissenschaftsrat [German Council of Science and Humanities],
2015), we have considerable doubts that the arguments in
2“Für die Berechnung der LOM (leistungsorientierte Mittel; remark of authors)
der jeweiligen leistungserbringenden Einheit (Abteilung bzw. Klinik) kann im
Sinne einer stufenweisen Einführung von Qualitätskriterien die Bewertung
erfolgter Original-Publikationen unter Verwendung des ungewichteten Impact
Faktor der jeweiligen Publikationsorgane (JIF) erfolgen. Dabei können Erst- und
Letztautorschaft mit je einem Drittel berücksichtigt werden; das verbleibende
Drittel kann auf alle übrigen Autoren verteilt werden [. . .].” [Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) [German Science Foundation], 2004, p. 15].
3During the last 4 years, two of the authors (FMP, SK) have noted several calls for
senior positions in medical departments where applicants were formally required
to provide JIF based information such as the accumulated JIF or average JIF. While
we do not have information about the generalizability of these practices we think
it is not surprising that institutions who distribute funds according to JIF also
select people based on this measure following the idea that “the best predictor
for future behavior is past behavior.” Notably, the circularity – in the sense that
people are selected for senior positions based on the JIF and the JIF is then used as a
predictor for career success – might very well contribute to the association between
the average JIF of a scientists’ publications and their success on the academic job
market (Van Dijk et al., 2014). This association might thus rather reflect staffing
policies instead of providing evidence for the usefulness of the JIF as a predictor of
academic achievements.
support of using the JIF for measuring scientific excellence are
justified. In this comment we want to look at the problem
of using the JIF from a different perspective and carefully
(re)evaluate the arguments for its use as an estimate of scientific
quality based on principles of deductive and inductive reasoning.
Thereby, we hope to better understand the beliefs about the
JIF that influence decisions in academia and the implications
of policies that use the JIF to assess and remunerate scientific
quality. Beyond the specific case of the JIF, this exercise might
also help to specify more general misconceptions when using
measures for journal rank to evaluate science, in order to
overcome incentive structures based on journal-based metrics
altogether.
DEDUCTIVE FALLACY WHEN USING
THE JIF
A basic belief when using the JIF for evaluating the quality
of a specific manuscript seems to be that (1) if a paper is
published in a high impact factor journal (p) then the paper
is of high quality (q)4. Why would scientists believe this? A
straightforward reason is the idea that it is more difficult to
publish in a high impact factor journal because higher standards
of research quality and novelty have to be passed in order to
be accepted. The average number of citations of a journal’s
articles within in a specific time period signals the average
breadth of interest in these articles during that time period,
which can of course be affected by many factors other than
research quality. But as a first approximation, let us suppose
that belief (1) is the case. What can we conclude from it? If
we see a paper published in a high impact factor journal, we
could then draw the deductively valid inference of modus ponens
(MP: if p then q, p, therefore q)5 and conclude that the paper
is of high quality. But what if we see a paper published in a
low impact factor journal? Can we draw any conclusions in this
case?
One aspect of the impact factor fallacy could be
operationalized as the tendency to draw the deductively
invalid inference of denial of the antecedent (DA: if p then q,
not-p, therefore not-q). This inference is deductively invalid
because it is logically consistent for the premises if p then q
and not-p to be true and yet the conclusion not-q to be false.
When the premises of an inference can be true and at the same
time the conclusion false, the inference does not preserve truth
when going from premises to conclusion. In order to argue
that the conclusion is not false in a particular case, we would
therefore have to go beyond this argument and provide further
information that might increase support for the conclusion.
For the more realistic case that the premises and conclusion
are uncertain, such that they can not only be either true
4When we speak of “high” and “low” impact in this manuscript, the arguments we
make are independent of whether “high” and “low” refer to the absolute JIF of a
journal, or to the JIF relative to a specific research domain.
5Here p and q stand for arbitrary propositions. For example, p might stand for
“This paper is published in a high impact factor journal” and q for “This paper is
of high quality.”
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or false, but can be held with varying degrees of belief, the
inference of DA is probabilistically invalid (p-invalid) because
there are coherent6 probability assignments to premises and
conclusion for which the probability of the conclusion is lower
than the sum of the probabilities of the premises (Adams,
1998; Over, 2016). The probabilistic case is therefore analogous
to the binary one. In the binary case, DA does not preserve
truth from premises to conclusion; and in the probabilistic
case, DA does not preserve probability from premises to
conclusion. The latter means that it can be warranted to have
a high degree of belief in the premises and yet a very low
degree of belief in the conclusion. In order to justify the
conclusion in a particular instantiation of the argument, we
would have to bring further information into the discussion
beyond that contained in the premises. Applied to the JIF
example, suppose we assume that if a paper is published
in a high impact factor journal, it is of high quality, and
then encounter a paper that is published in a low impact
factor journal. From this alone it is not justified to conclude
that the paper we encountered is not of high quality7. In
order to draw such a conclusion, we would require more
information.
Denial of the antecedent (DA) is of course not the only
inference one can draw based on the conditional belief that
if a paper is published in a high impact factor journal, then
it is of high quality. A similar, deductively valid inference
results if we add a further premise to DA: “If a paper is not
published in a high impact factor journal, then it is not of
high quality.” One can combine this new conditional premise
with the conditional premise that we already had: “If a paper
is published in a high impact factor journal, then it is of high
quality,” to obtain the following biconditional premise: “A paper
is published in a high impact factor journal if and only if it is of
high quality.” From this biconditional premise (or equivalently
from the two conditional premises) together with the premise
that a specific paper was not published in a high impact factor
journal, one can indeed validly conclude that the paper is not
of high quality. However, this inference will only be useful if
one believes the biconditional premise to a non-negligible degree
in the first place. If the biconditional premise is implausible,
then any deductively valid conclusion based on it will also
tend to be implausible, precisely because it follows logically
from an implausible starting assumption. Considering that most
scientists are likely to agree that it is not only implausible
but false that a paper is of high quality if and only if it is
6Two statements are coherent if and only if they respect the axioms of probability
theory. For example, these axioms state that if we believe it is 80% likely to rain,
then in order for our beliefs to be coherent we should also be willing to believe that
it is 20% likely not to rain, otherwise the probabilities involved would not sum up
to 1.
7Notably, this argument also applies to manuscripts uploaded on preprint servers
which have not been peer-reviewed. In line of this argument, here the lack of
peer-review does not necessarily imply inferior quality. We think that preprint
repositories are very interesting testbeds, since the fundamental lack of information
on the quality of articles through journal-based metrics (see the section on
inductive inference below) might motivate scientists and institutions to evaluate
the quality and importance of the work more by reading the articles instead of
relying on numbers or reputation of publication organs.
published in a high impact factor journal, the fact that the
inference from this biconditional is valid has no use for practical
purposes.
INDUCTIVE FALLACIES WHEN USING
THE JIF
One could argue that deduction, and with it logical validity, has
little impact on actual reasoning and decision making outside
of the mathematics classroom, and that therefore the inferences
we should be looking at when analyzing the use of the JIF in
the practice of science should rather be inductive (Evans, 2002;
Oaksford and Hahn, 2007; Chater et al., 2011; Baratgin and
Politzer, 2016).
An inductive inference that might describe well the use
of the impact factor is the informal fallacy of the argument
from ignorance (or its Latin equivalent “ad ignorantiam”). This
argument tries to justify a conclusion by pointing out that there is
no evidence against it. Typical examples could be “No side effects
were found for this treatment in clinical trials. Therefore this
treatment is safe” or “No one has proven that ghosts do not exist.
Therefore ghosts exist” (Oaksford and Hahn, 2004, 2007; Hahn
and Oaksford, 2007). In the case of the JIF, if a paper comes from
a high impact journal this can be seen as a sign suggesting it is
an excellent piece of work. But as we saw above in the discussion
of DA, this does not imply that if the paper was published in a
low impact factor journal this is a sign suggesting that the quality
of the paper is low. A more precise description of the situation
would be that a low impact factor journal lacks the sign of high
quality that a high JIF provides. If a paper is published in a low
impact journal then we have less information about its quality,
rather than having information suggesting that its quality is low.
It is an argument from ignorance to use the absence of impact
factor based evidence for high quality to conclude that a paper is
of low quality.
However, the argument from ignorance is not always a bad
argument (Hahn and Oaksford, 2007, 2012). Its strength depends
on how informative the lack of information about something
being the case is in the situation at hand. Suppose we search
a book in a library catalog and do not find it. In this case it
is reasonable to use the lack of information about the book
in the catalog to conclude that the book is not in the library.
Similarly, if we look at a train timetable and do not see a
particular town listed, it is reasonable to conclude that the train
does not stop in that town. However, suppose we are planning
a party and have invited the whole department, in the hope
that a particular person we are attracted to will attend. In this
case a lack of information indicating that the person will come
does not warrant the conclusion that the person will not come.
Catalogs and timetables are fairly closed environments in which
we can expect all relevant information to be stated explicitly.
But environments like those of social interactions or research
endeavors with myriads of available scholarly communication
channels are more open, so that the absence of information about
something being the case simply does not warrant us to conclude
that it is not the case. A consequence for the JIF would be that
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 August 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1487
fpsyg-09-01487 August 16, 2018 Time: 19:15 # 4
Paulus et al. The Impact Factor Fallacy
low impact publications do not signal low research quality, but
rather uncertainty about the quality and the need to gather more
information in order to be able to determine research quality.
Two further inductive inferences that might be relevant in
accounting for the use of the JIF are the informal fallacies of
the argument from authority (also called by the Latin name “ad
verecundiam”), and of the ad hominem argument (Bhatia and
Oaksford, 2015; Hahn and Hornikx, 2016). The argument from
authority tries to justify a conclusion by pointing out that some
expert or authority endorses the conclusion. Typical examples
could be “Scientist x says that the treatment is safe. Therefore
the treatment is safe,” “My parents say that Santa Claus exists.
Therefore Santa Claus exists” or “My peers say that clothing item
x is great. Therefore clothing item x is great.” In the case of the
JIF, a high impact factor of a journal would play the role of an
authority for the quality of the papers within it.
In contrast, the ad hominem argument tries to justify the
rejection of a conclusion by pointing to personal attributes of
a person that endorses it. Typical examples could be “The new
treatment was developed by a person with no formal degree in
the subject. Therefore the treatment is not safe,” or “A person
without a driver’s license says “don’t drink alcohol while driving.”
Therefore, it is false that you should not drink alcohol while
driving.” In the case of the JIF, a low impact factor would be used
to give a journal a reputation of low quality, and this low quality
reputation would then be transferred to the papers within it.
Like the argument from ignorance, the argument from expert
opinion and the ad hominem argument are not always bad
arguments. Their quality varies as a function of how informative
the authority status, or the personal attributes of the instance
endorsing them, is for the problem at hand. Policy decisions
are routinely based on the advice of experts, and there seems
to be agreement that this is a good thing to do, as long as the
experts are really considered experts in their field and their advice
is not biased (Harris et al., 2016; c.f. Sloman and Fernbach,
2017). Dismissing an argument because of personal attributes
of a person endorsing it is often more difficult, because it has
to be made plausible that those attributes are relevant to the
quality of the argument. For example, that one does not need
to be a mother to be qualified for being prime minister seems
obvious, whereas a case of a person applying to a position against
gender discrimination, who in his private life beats his wife, is
likely to be more controversial. In the case of the JIF, we would
have to justify why we think that a low impact factor indicates
that a particular journal is of low quality, and why this low
quality can be transferred to a particular paper within it. Such
a judgment requires further information about the journal and
about the paper at hand to be justified, which is usually not
provided and difficult to obtain since it might e.g., not be clear if
review processes in lower JIF journals are less able to detect errors
(Brembs, 2018). Thus, whereas a high impact factor may add to
the reputation of a journal, a low impact factor does not warrant
a bad reputation, but rather provides insufficient information
about reputation (see Table 1 for examples of the inductive and
deductive fallacies as discussed here).
Until now we have discussed inferences on the basis of the
belief that if a paper is published in a high impact factor journal,
then it is of high quality. But although this belief can sometimes
be useful as a quick approximation or rule of thumb, it is often
itself not warranted.
First, the mean number of citations of the papers in a
journal reflect of the average breadth of interest in these papers
during the first years after publication, which is not the same
as research quality. For example, a high quality paper may
have a low citation rate because research in specific fields
(e.g., the humanities) is less dependent on the cumulative
knowledge of what goes before (Van Noorden, 2017), or
because it is going unnoticed for a long time (a so-called
“sleeping beauty”) and only “awakened by a prince” years after
publication (c.f. van Raan, 2004). Conversely, a paper may also
have high citation rates because of highly consequential flaws
within it, which attracts attention and stimulates the scientific
discourse.
Secondly, it is often not warranted because the inference
from a metric defined at the journal level to the features of an
individual paper within that journal might involve an ecological
fallacy.
ECOLOGICAL FALLACY WHEN USING
THE JIF
Finally, the evaluation of manuscripts based on the JIF bears
an ecological fallacy. When comparing group level data, such as
the average citations of journals, it is difficult up to impossible
to infer the likelihood of the outcome for comparisons on the
individual level, such as citations of manuscripts. In fact, it is
relatively easy to think of examples where the likelihood to find a
manuscript with more than 12 citations per year in a lower impact
journal exceeds the likelihood of finding such manuscript in a
higher impact journal. This type of ecological fallacy occurs when
the distribution of citations is heavily and differentially skewed
within each higher-level unit, i.e., the journals. This is typically
the case when it comes to citation rates of journals (see e.g., Weale
et al., 2004; Larivière et al., 2016).
Accordingly, a journal with a JIF of 12 might contain few
manuscripts that were cited several hundred times in the previous
2 years, but many others that were rarely cited during the same
period. Such a citation pattern would result in a heavily skewed
distribution of citations per article, while another journal with
a JIF of 10 might have a normally distributed citation rate of
articles for the same time period. Without further knowledge
of the distribution of citations within the journals in a given
year (i.e., information at the individual level) concluding that a
manuscript in the journal with a higher JIF is of better quality (or
of broader interest) might bear an ecological fallacy, because it
is possible that the likelihood of finding a manuscript with more
citations in the lower impact journal is not reflected by the JIF.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
With this comment, we hope to have highlighted some
misconceptions in the beliefs and arguments involved in using
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TABLE 1 | The deductive and inductive fallacies discussed in this paper.
Name Form Plausible example Implausible example Journal impact factor example
Deductive fallacy
Denial of the
antecedent
If p then q. Not-p.Therefore
not-q.
If the glass falls down then
it breaks. The glass does
not fall down. Therefore,
the glass does not break.
If you carry an umbrella
then you stay dry. You do
not carry an umbrella.
Therefore, you do not stay
dry.
If a paper is published in a high
impact factor journal, then it is of
high quality. This paper is not
published in a high impact factor
journal. Therefore, this paper is not
of high quality.
Inductive fallacies
Argument from
ignorance
It is not known that p is true
(false). Therefore p is false
(true).
The book is not listed in the
library catalog. Therefore,
the book is not in the library.
No one has proven that
ghosts do not exist.
Therefore, ghosts exist.
This paper does not have the
quality sign of having been
published in a high impact factor
journal. Therefore, this paper is not
of high quality.
Argument From
authority
This expert says that p is
true. Therefore p is true.
Medical experts say that
this treatment is safe.
Therefore, this treatment is
safe.
My parents say that Santa
Claus exists. Therefore,
Santa Claus exists.
This paper does not have the
authority backing of having been
published in a high impact factor
journal. Therefore, this paper is not
of high quality.
Ad hominem argument This untrustworthy person
says that p is true.
Therefore p is false.
A person without training
says that this treatment is
safe. Therefore, this
treatment is not safe.
A person without a driver’s
license says “don’t drink
alcohol while driving.”
Therefore, it is false that
you should not drink
alcohol while driving.
This paper was published in a
journal with low quality reputation
due to a low impact factor.
Therefore, this paper is not of high
quality.
journal-based metrics, and specifically the JIF, for evaluating the
work of scientists. While some of the thoughts described here
are introduced to illustrate the most controversial arguments,
others better approximate the reality of decision making in
academia. In this exercise, we think it became clear that without
the specification of further premises besides the simple idea
that publishing in high-impact journals is an indicator for high
scientific quality the validity of the conclusions is not warranted.
These additional premises need to be explicitly expressed in
the argument, otherwise the plausibility of the premises and
accordingly the conclusion cannot be verified. Only if one
believes in the premises to a non-negligible degree in first
place, for example that manuscripts published in journals with
a low JIF are of low quality, this could end up in a plausible
conclusion in case of a valid deduction. Similarly, also for
inductive inferences additional explicit assumptions are needed
to arrive at plausible conclusions. The simple lack of a journal-
based quality sign is not sufficient to conclude that a manuscript
is of low quality. One could consider scientific publishing a
closed environment where people follow similar rules and have
no degrees of freedom regarding where and why to submit their
work to provide a strong argument for this case. Given the
complexity of the matter, it is surprising to see many political
and academic institutions as well as scientists argue that they
are evaluating the “quality of science” while providing weak
arguments, drawing invalid conclusions, or weighing their lack
of information and uncertainty about the subject when using
the JIF.
From an economic perspective, however, it might in fact
be a successful strategy to minimize the uncertainty about
the quality of the evaluated work, person, or institution by
relying on the JIF or other journal based metrics (Nature
Editorial, 2018), and it might also be better to have a weak
argument than to have no argument. Evaluating the quality
of a scientist’s work surely is a time-consuming process and
it takes much more effort than simply comparing impact
factors. Accordingly, deans, commissions, or institutions which
might not have the resources for an actual assessment
of “scientific excellence” have reasons to rely on the JIF.
However, it should be clear that those decisions are not
based on the quality of the scientific contribution per se
but, optimistically, somehow integrate the availability of
information about the quality. This distinction makes an
important difference for communicating and justifying decisions
in academia. As an illustrative example, one can compare
the situation of deciding that a candidate does not deserve
tenure because one thinks that the quality of the work was
not good enough, to deciding that a candidate does not
deserve tenure because one lacks information and is uncertain
whether the quality of the work was good enough. While
persons and institutions usually communicate as if they were
following the first argument, their justification most often
implies the latter if they base their decisions on journal-based
metrics.
The JIF is arguably the most popular journal-based metric
of our times, but it has already been subject to severe criticism
in the past (Seglen, 1997; Lehmann et al., 2006; Della Sala
and Crawford, 2007; Simons, 2008; Brembs et al., 2013; Reich,
2013; DePellegrin and Johnston, 2015; Werner, 2015). As a
result, it seems that (some) individuals and institutions within
the scientific community are ready to shake off the JIF at
some point in the nearer future (Alberts, 2013; Cagan, 2013;
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Callaway, 2016). We want to point out that the problems
described here apply in one way or another to any journal-
based assessment. If journals would drop out of the “impact
factor game” (PLoS Medicine Editorial, 2006) publications in
some journals might still be regarded as more valuable than in
others. It is difficult to quantify those influences, but having a
publication in one of the “golden club” journals (Reich, 2013)
could simply replace the metric of the JIF with another, more
implicit qualitative measure for distinguishing prestigious from
less prestigious journals. Thereby, the fallacies and problems
described above would continue to govern decision making in
academia as long as we base them on any kind of journal-based
assessment and the rank of publication organs.
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